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ECONOMIC Iff>ERIALIS~1 AND OLIOOPOLIZATICl~ OF TRADE 
IN THE OOIJ) COAST: 1886-1939 * 
by 
Rhoda Howard 
The takeover of the economy of the Gold Coast by foreign 
business concerns, in conjunction with a foreign government 
imposed by force upon the inhabitants of that territory, 
provided the framework both for the integration of the Gold 
Coast into the world capitalist system, and for the limita-
tions to its potential for change and growth within that 
system. 
In general, the capitalist system encourages weaker, 
undeveloped countries to develop by introducing them to new 
markets and new products, but it also ensures .that the 
interests of the weaker economies will be subordinate to the 
interests of the stronger. Competitive advantages which 
accrue to the older and richer capitalist states (eg. in 
technology, accountancy, managerial skills and labour produc-
tivity) are reinforced by a constant tendency towards monopoly 
of trade, and given permanence by the imposition of political 
as well as economic control over peripheral countries. The 
Ghanaian example demonstrates that even without the wholesale 
expropriation of their lands and resources from a colonized 
people, and even wi.thout the radical reorganization of indi-
genous society in the interests of the imperialist power, the 
introduction of the capitalist system into an undeveloped 
economy will distort future development in the direction of 
the interests of the more developed capitalist economies. 
Underdevelopment is concomitant with development.l 
This article will deal with the mechanisms of the eco-
nomic takeover of the Gold Coast, between approximately 1885 
and 1939. Two aspects of the takeover are dealt with: the 
progressive oligopolization of trading, shipping, and banking 
in the colony, and the influence which oligopolistic British 
firms exerted on government policy. The oligopolization re-
sulted in the underdevelopment of the African trading class 
and its inability to develop into a genuine capitalist class; 
while the pursuance of a goverrunent policy dedicated to main-
taining Ghana's role as a peripheral import-export economy 
resulted in the internal economic underdevelopment of the 
colony. 
A. European Oligopolization of the Gold Coast Trade. 
From the time of their first contacts with each other 
until the 1880's, African and European capitalists competed 
on relatively equal terms in the Gold Coast. But with the 
beginnings of oligopolization of trade, and the introduction 
of foreign political control, opportunities for Gold Coast 
Africans soon declined. 
After the abolition of the slave trade, it was some 
years before a new product was found which could guarantee 
the Gold Coast's continued participation as a producer in the 
world economy. But, with developments in industrial Europe, 
by the end of the nineteenth century palm oil became a nece-
ssary ingredient for candles, soap, and machine oil, and cocoa 
found a market as a new food to feed the now comparatively 
weal thy working classes. A new "legitimate" role arose for 
the Gold Coast, as a producer no longer of slave labour but 
of industrial and consumer raw products. But the vast demand 
for these goods necessitated more rapid and organized trans-
port, the capacity to handle large amounts 9f goods on a 
regular basis, and reliable supplies of capital and credit, 
as well as regular commercial contacts not only in the Gold 
Coast but also in Britain, on the Continent, and in America. 
The needs of the industrialized West could no longer be ful-
filled by small traders, African or European, with their 
sporadic supplies. The process of sales and mergers which 
culminated in the formation of the United Africa Company 
(which by 1938 had engulfed no fewer than 145 firms) began 
in 1900 with the first of the many trade agreements which 
were to persist in the Gold Coast trade during the twentieth 
century. 
Chart 1 .indicates the major firms which were integrated 
into the United Africa Company in 1929, as well as indicating 
its competitors after that date. As can be seen, the system 
was not a complete monolith. Several Continental firms .stood 
outside of UAC control (although certain German firms which 
had had a considerable share of the Gold Coast market were 
eliminated from the scene during the first World War) • More-
over, certain British firms remained independent of its 
control. Of these, the cocoa manufacturing companies, Cadbury 
Brothers Ltd., J. S. Fry and Sons, and J. Lyons and Co. were 
particularly significant in the Gold Coast context because, 
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as they bought cocoa not for resale on the international 
market but for their own chocolate manufacturing, they were 
prepared to offer higher prices to African producers than the 
trading firms could offer. It was not until the 1930's that 
UAC was able to put sufficient pressure upon the chocolate 
manufacturers through price undercutting and denial of ship-
ping space, to compel them tO conform to the prices offered 
by the giant merchant firms. 2 
Nevertheless, from 1900 on, whatever competition existed 
between the individual European firms on the Gold Coast was 
tempered by sundry agreements to control both the buying and 
the selling aspects of trade. Table 1 lists only some of 
these agreements. 
Table 1 - Trade Agreements in the Gold Coast 
1. 01/10/1901. Pooling Agreement between the African Associa-
tion Ltd., Alexander Millers and Co., and F. 
and A. Swanzy Ltd. 
2. 20/02/1902. Agreement~ re palm kernels between the African 
Association Ltd., Alexander Miller, Brother and 
Co. , and the German West African Co. 
Chart 1. European Firms in the Gold Coast 
A. Major Firms forming the United Africa Company.3 
African Alex. Miller 
Association Brother and Co. 
(1889) (1896) * (1865) (1868) 
F. and A. Swanzy 
(1807 or before) 
Niger Company 
(1884) 
African and Eastern 
Trade Corporation ** 
(1919) 
takeover by 
Lever Brothers 
in 1920 *** 
United Africa Company 
(1929) **** 
B. Principal Competitors of the United Africa Company after 
1929. 
British 
~adbury Brothers Ltd. (1899) (1907) 
J .s. Fry and Sons Ltd. (1896) (?) 
(amalgamated with Cadbury Bros .1918) 
J. Lyons and Co. (1894) (?) 
European 
Cie. Fran~aise de l'Afri-
que Occidentale (c.l845) 
(1909) 
Socie'te Commerciale de 
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w. Bartholemew and Co.(l926) (1926) 
Busi and Stephenson Ltd.(?) (c.l930) 
John Holt and Co. (Liverpool) Ltd. 
(c. 1860) (c. 1935) 
G.B. oilivant Ltd. (c.l840) (?) 
Patterson, Zochonis and Co. Ltd. 
(1890) (c.l933) 
C Pr~ncipal Shipping Co~panies. 
l'Ouest Africain (1907) 
(1914) 
Swiss African Trading Co. 
(1922) (1922) 
Union Trading Company(Basel 
Mission Trading Company) 
(1865) (1865) 
Elder, Dempster and Co. Ltd. (1899) 
African Steam Ship Co. (1952) 
comprising and 
British and African Steam Navigation Company (1865) 
Woerrnann Lines (1882) (1885) 
Elder Dempster and Woerrnann Lines joined into the West African 
Shipping Conference 1895. 
D. Banks. 
Bank of British West Africa Ltd. (1894) (1896). (formed by 
Elder, Dempster and Co. Ltd.) 
Colonial Bank (1836), entered Gold Coast 1916, name changed to 
Barclays Bank ~minion, Colonial and Overseas 1925. 
* First brackets indicate date of incorporation, second 
brackets indicate date of entry into the Gold Coast (when 
information is available) 
** Aside from those mentioned above, African· and Eastern in-
cluded 26 other We at African companies. 
*** and joined to 28 other West Africa companies previously 
· or subsequently acquired by Lever Brothers. 
**** Between 1929 and 1938 UAC acquired 29 more West Africa 
Companies. 
3. 03/ll/19.03. 1'ooling agreement between Messrs. F. and A. 
Swanzy Ltd. and ~llers L_~d. 
4. 01/03/1904. Agreement re sharing -in proportion to the capital 
of each party the net profits of the businesses 
of the parties carried -on in the Gold C0ast- and 
the German Colony, between F. and A. Swanzy Ltd., 
Millers Ltd., and the African Association Ltd. 
Expired 31/12/1913. 
5. 10/05/1906;11/07/1910; 22/05/1913. Agreements between F. 
and A. Swanzy, Millers Ltd., the African Asso-
ciation. 
6. 1905. Accra Produce Agreement. Between F·. and A. Swanzy Ltd., 
Miliers Ltd., the African Association Ltd., J. 
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J. Fischer and Co., the (Basel) Mission Trading 
Company and the German West African Trading 
Company. 
7. 13/02/06. Volta Produce Agreement for pooling purchases of 
cocoa, rubber, palm oil and palm kernels between 
the (Basel) Mission Trading Company, F. and A. 
Swanzy Ltd., Chevalier and Co., and Millers Ltd. 
8. 1905, 1909, 1914. Sundry timber pool agreements between the 
Gold Coast Machinery and Trading Co. Ltd., F. 
and A. Swanzy Ltd., Millers Ltd., and the 
African Association Ltd. 
9. 27/07/12. Agreement re staple articles between the Basel 
Mission Trading Co., the African Association 
Ltd., Millers Ltd., and F. and A. Swanzy. 
10. 1925/26. Cocoa Pool Agreement. African and Eastern Trade 
Corporation and others. 
11. 07/01/30. Agreement for the purchase and sale of palm oil 
and palm kernels between the UAC, John Holt and 
Co. (Liverpool) Ltd., G. B. Ollivant, and Pa-
·tterson and Zochonis. 
12. 18/05/35. Agreement re the Gold Coast Motor Business bet-
ween Cie. Francaise de !'Afrique Occidentale, 
Societe Commerciale de !'Ouest Africain, Union 
Trading Co., W. Bartholemew and Co., and UAC. 
13. 30/11/36. Agreements covering the sale of palm oil and 
palm kernels between UAC, John Holt and Co., 
and G. B. Ollivant Ltd. 
14. 27/07/1934. Gold Coast Merchandise Agreement. (and supple-
ment 18/06/1937). 
15. 10/11/37. Agreement between w. Bartholemew and Co., UAC 
and eleven others for division of cocoa in the 
Gold Coast (The Cocoa Pool) .4 
It can be seen from the above, that the Gold Coast trade 
was very \'l"ell organized. Agreements, which never included any 
African-owned firms, covered produce (including cocoa, palm 
products, rubber, and timber) and merchandise. It should be 
noted that not only exports but also imports were subject to 
price fixing and that strong sanctions were imposed on those 
partied to Agreements who did not adhere to the agreed struc-
ture. Moreover, prices charged for imported goods were gear-
ed to rise or fall with the prices paid for cocoa. 
A comparison between cocoa and store 
prices shows a connection. Merchants admit 
that it is their practice to raise store 
prices when cocoa prices rise. Merchants 
meet once or twice per month in Sal tpond 
and fix prices for their principal goods. 
An 'Approved Price List' is produced •.• 
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The total trade of each district is 
divided amongst the firms and a firm is 
allowed to sell a certain percentage only 
of the total district sales of any of the 
principal goods.5 
The dominance of trade by European firms was reinforced 
by tight European control of shipping and banking in the Colo-
ny. The two predominant shipping firms, Elder Dempster and 
Woermann Lines, which were able to take control of the West 
African trade when the introduction of steam ships eliminated 
many of the smaller independent merchant-shippers who owned 
sailing boats, joined into the West African Shipping COnference 
in 1895. They effectively eliminated competition by insti tu-
ting a system of 10% rebates to merchants who shipped exclu~ 
sively on their vessels. Elder Dempster further consolidated 
its power by gaini~g control of lighterage and inland waterway 
facilities in West Africa. Its weaker ally, Woermann Lines, 
was also obliged to accept an agreement whereby Elder Dempster 
could call at European ports but Woermann could not call at 
British ports.6 Many European traders objected to this mono-
poly of shipping, especially as the larger merchants were able 
to obtain special rates from Elder Dempster, despite that 
company's protestations that it promoted competition by char-
ging the same rates to all. 
The oligopolistic control of the Gold Coast economy 
was further reinforced in 1895 when the Elder Dempster shipping 
line set up the first, and until 1916 the only, bank to exist 
in the Gold Coast, the Bank of British West Africa. In 1916, 
apparently without opposition, the Colonial Bank was permitted 
to enter the Gold COast. A number of interlocking directorates 
between these two banks, the shipping agencies, and the domi-
nant trading firms (but excluding the chocolate manufacturing 
companies) strengthened the tendency for co-operation. 
Table 2 - Interlocking Directorships in the West African 
Trade 8 
Year Name of Director 
'Sir Alfred Lewis Jones 
1905 Owen Harrison Williams 
1915 Cli.fford Blackburn Edgar 
1915 Sir Owen c. Philipps 
1915 Mazzini Stuart 
Companies Directed 
Elder Dempster Shipping Ltd. 
Bank of British West Africa 
Elder Dempster Shipping Ltd. 
Bank of British West Africa 
Bank of British West Africa 
Niger Company 
Elder, Dempster and Co. Ltd. 
Bank of British West Africa 
African Association Ltd. 
1915 Owen Harrison Williams 
1925 James Henly Batty 
1925 0. V. G. Hoare 
1925 Lord Kylsant 
{Sir OWen c. Philipps) 
1925 Mazzini Stuart 
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Bank of British West Africa 
African Steamship Company 
British and African Steam 
Navigation Co. 
Bank of British West Africa 
African and Eastern Trade Co. 
Ltd. 
Ashanti Goldfields Corporation 
African and Eastern Trade Co. 
Ltd. 
Colonial Bank 
Elder, Dempster and Co. L·td. 
Bank of British West Africa Ltd. 
African and Eastern Trade Co. 
Ltd. 
Bank of British West Africa 
From this selected list it will be noted that there were, 
of course, strong ties between Elder Dempster and the Bank of 
British West Africa. There were also ties between the Bank 
and the trading firms which were later to become part of UAC, 
as well as some ties between this group and Ashanti Goldfields, 
the foremost gold mine in the Colony, and the Colonial Bank. 
Added to these interlocking directorships were a host of ex-
ternal connections to banking, shipping, railway and insurance 
companies in Britain, to independent soap-manufacturing compa-
nies, and to international mining consortia. It was ·a strong 
network, based in the cities of Liverpool, London, and Man-
chester, and one which the African aspirant to trade could 
hardly hope to crack. 
Even when the African obtained space on the Conference 
shipping lines, he could not hope to be charged the same pre-
ferential rates as the European bulk shippers. Nor could he 
hope to be able to afford, with his limited resources, to bu~ 
the kind of large steam ship necessary for the modern trade. 
Without adequate resources, it was also difficult for him to 
obtain insurance. Moreover, the banks, when they entered the 
West Coast, catered entirely to other Europeans. All the 
European merchants, with the exception of the SWiss and French 
firms, who sometimes preferred banks of their own nationality, 
were financed through the Bank of British West Africa and the 
Colonial Bank. During the cocoa season, millions of pounds 
were made available by the banks to the European cocoa buyers. 
The African buyer could not hope to command such amounts if 
only because most decisions concerning large amounts of credit 
were made by the Banks' Head Offices in London, where would-be 
African borrowers did not have representatives. The bankers 
argued that Africans did not "understand" the banking system. 
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But willing as they were to accept such African deposits as 
were offered, it seems the banks charged higher rates for 
services to Africans than to Europeans.lO It could perhaps 
therefore be argued that African traders understood the 
banking system only too well. 
The banks argued that Africans were a poor credit risk. 
And it would indeed seem that if there were one single factor 
which eliminated the Gold Coast African as a significant 
competitor in the trading world, that factor would be credit. 
The indigenous Gold Coast property and credit system had been 
based on slave owning and pawning, ll institutions which were 
_destroyed in righteous anger by the British in 1874. In the 
absence of a system of private property in land, Africans 
were left with nothing but gold trinkets and buildings to 
offer· as collateral to Europeans from whom they wished to 
obtain credit. The system was self-defeating, since as long 
as they had to invest in houses in order to have mortgagable 
property for credit purposes, Africans were compelled to 
divert their resources from more profitable investments, thus 
reinforcing the European view of them as spenders, not savers. 
In any event, the trade after 1880 assumed large-scale 
international proportions. Few Africans had, or could 
marshal , the European and American contacts necessary to 
enter the export-import trade in competition with the British. 
A large proportion of Gold Coast produce went not to the 
United Kingdom but to European and American markets. Similar-
ly many imported goods came from outside the United Kingdom. 
But agents hired in Britain to act for African traders were 
at best unreliable and at worst dishonest. The prevalent 
European view of the African as shiftless, unreliable, child-
like and dishonest was no doubt a major cause both of the 
reluctance of the honest banker or shipper to deal with the 
indigenous tradesman, and of the alacrity with which the dis-
honest European cheated him. 
While more than a few Africans became successful busi-
nessmen despite the difficul.ties elaborated above, the most 
common opportunity for the entrepreneurial Gold Coast African 
after the 1880's was to act as a middle-man for the European. 
There was little direct contact in the Gold Coast between 
the expatriate businessman and the ultimate consumer or 
producer of the goods in which he dealt. In a few of ·the 
larger towns,retail shops tended to be managed by Europeans. 
But for the most part, .they were managed by African agents 
who not only sold imported goods but sometimes acted as cocoa 
buyers as well. 12 These Africans were responsible for the 
day-to-day running of the store, for all stocks, and o"ften for 
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book-keeping. However, ultimate financial control and the 
power to sign cheques remained in the hands of a European 
supervisor. African agents were bound by contracts forbidding 
them to engage in trade on their own or to move from one · · 
employer to the next.l3 
The African who did try to eng.age in trade on his own 
could be, and was, easily undercut by his European competitors. 
Should he nonetheless succeed, he was often offered a position 
as an independent .agent for a European firm, with a guarantee 
of more custom than he could obtain on his own. Through the 
passbook system, which allowed each African retailer credit up 
to a certain amount (often arbitrarily decided upon by which-
ever European he or she happened to be dealing with) the 
African could easily be tied not only to the expatriate net-
work but also to a specific expatriate firm. Because the 
passbook system fulfilled the function of providing credit, 
large African retailers were pulled into the hands of their 
expatriate competitors. 
A second middleman role for the African entrepreneur was 
as a cocoa broker; one who, in return for advances from the 
European cocoa firm, went in to the "bush" to buy cocoa from 
the peasant producer. This role was more lucrative than that 
of a store .agent. For aside from receiving his commission and 
various perquisites (such as gifts, free bags, and rent-free 
cocoa storage units) from the expatriate employer who had to 
compete for his services with other European firms, the broker 
could give advances on cocoa at a low price and then sell it 
at a higher price at the time of the harvest. Moreover, as 
the price of cocoa was known to fluctuate from day to day, 
he could often argue that he had bought the cocoa at more than 
the going price. And as there was a two to four day gap 
before Accra prices reached the bush, he could compel his 
European customer to pay him extra. Brokers often branched 
out to become moneylenders and financially powerful members of 
the community. But their wealth was insecure and they could 
be wiped out by a fall in prices which did not repay their 
advances .14 
B. European Firms and Economic Policy in the Gold Coast. 
Between about 1880 and 1910 the Gold Coast entered the 
world capitalist system as a full-fledged peripheral nation 
producing raw materials for export to the rapacious factories 
and workers of the industrial West. Her economy boomed as 
both exports and imports increased phenomenally. But she paid 
for this boom with a stagnant economic structure. From 1910 
unil the . second World War, the European firms, with the help 
of the British government, sought to maintain the peripheral 
80 
import-export monoculture which they found so profitable. 
The aim of the political power in the Gold Coast was 
to preserve the colony's economic value for Britain. What-
ever the hurnani tarian and "civilizing" goals of the individual 
members of the Colonial Service who administered that country, 
the Colonial Office in London,which formulated most important 
policies, was sensitive to an often in agreement with the 
desires of the dominant British firms. Government and the 
British business interests co-operated on several levels.15 
The most diffuse of these was that of personal contacts 
between business and government in Britain and the colonies, 
contacts often reinforced by the membership of prominent 
West African traders in the House of Commons. In the colony 
itsel£, close contact was inevitable as there were so few 
expatriates. 
On a formal level, co-operation was embodied in the 
Joint West Africa Committee. This Committee was formed in 
1905 with two members each from the Liverpool, Manchester,and 
LORdon Chambers of Commerce, which regularly met with and 
advised the Colonial Office. In 1903 these three Chambers had 
also been granted the privilege of communicating directly with 
the Governor of the Gold Coast. Consultation with both the 
Colonial Office and the Governor was extensive. 
Furthermore, whereas Africans rarely, almost never, were 
asked to testify before the various Royal Commissions concern-
ed with the West African colonies,l6 the expatriate commercial 
community not only testified frequently to these committees 
but often had representatives acting as Commissioners.l7 
African and European unofficials were however given equal 
representation on the Gold Coast Legislative Council. But on 
almost all matters of disagreement in the Legislative Council 
the European unofficials voted with their official counterparts 
(a matter hardly surprising since the official policy was 
formulated by. the Colonial Office in consultation with the 
European unofficials' Head Offices in England). Thus the 
African had no effective voice on the only governing body to 
which he had access. 
There were strong commercial reasons for the takeover 
of the Gold Coast Colony in 1874 and the final takeover of 
Ashanti and the Northern Territories in 1901. As the nature 
of trade with the Gold Coast changed at the end of the nine-
teenth century, unhampered capitalism devoid of political 
control was not sufficient to guarantee the adequate function-
ing of the import-export economy. The most important function 
of the new British colonial government, from the point of view 
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of the European capitalists, was to establish and efficient 
and extensive transport system to facilitate the movement of 
goods. A secondary object was the maintenance of law and 
order, that is the "pacification" of recalcitrant tribes who 
were not willing to accept the new political and economic 
order, especially in the hinterland of Ashanti and the Northern 
Territories. 18 Ashanti especially was viewed as a huge 
potential market for cheap manufactured goods, which the 
coastal-based Europeans were anxious to exploit. 
In the early part of the twentieth century, and again in 
the 1920's there were extensive railway building programs, 
first leading to the mines and later extending to the cocoa-
producing areas. Road building was also encouraged as soon 
as the motor lorry was invented.. Three types of roads were 
built. In descending order of priority, they were feeder 
roads to the railways, trade roads, and "political" roads 
built to facilitate adrninistration.l9 
But once an adequate system of transport had been 
constructed and the entire territory had been opened up to 
European traders, pressure for expenditure on development 
from the commercial community diminished, and a concern for 
"free trade" became evident. The Gold Coast had been satis-
factorily integrated into the world capitalist system as a 
producer of raw materials and a consumer of cheap manufactured 
goods, and any further expenditure by the Government, designed 
to lessen the Colony's dependence on this relationship to the 
Ernp~re and the world, was viewed with suspicion as an unneces-
sary attempt to impose taxes on the expatriate firms. 
Thus until 1939 the pattern of Gold Coast imports and 
exports was very clearly one of dependence on the 'mother 
country" and on international market trends. Whereas until 
1910 several different crops had been exported from the colony, 
after that date the Gold Coast became heavily monocultural. 
Table 3: Major Exports - Per Cent of the Total by Value20 
Year Cocoa Palm Palm Rubber Timber Gold Diamonds Manga-
Oil Kernels nese 
1886 38.33 11.79 17.20 18.43 
1890 24.13 12.98 38.44 0.08 15.31 
1895 0.05 26.31 10.59 36.67 3.19 10.36 
1900 3.05 27.01 10.96 37.06 7.68 4.29 
1905 11.36 5.35 4.68 19.68 5.10 36.21 
1910 32.11 5.97 6.86 13.31 5.49 29.29 
1915 61.53 0.44 0.84 0.42 1.53 29.53 
1920 81.41 0.92 1.80 0.22 2. 77 7.20 
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1925 75.50 0.40 . 1.06 0.31 . 7. 71 0.91 6.25 
1930 61.75 0.10 0.61 0.19 0.89 9.36 5.84 7.29 
1935 52.19 0.07 0.43 0.14 1.10 26.43 5.48 6.14 
1939 31.42 . 0.03 0.17 0.20 0.34 38.05 2.86 4.87 
Exports of palm oil, palm kernels, rubber and timber declined 
drastically on a proportional basis and the colony was left 
almost entirely dependent for its revenues on cocoa and gold 
exports. The price of cocoa fluctuated violently on the 
world market, introducing chronic instability into the life 
of the African cocoa producer. Especially after the creation 
of the New York and London cocoa exchanges in the 1920's, 
cocoa became subject ,to speculative buying and selling. 
What few feeble attempts were made by the colonial 
government to diversify the Gold Coast's exports and reduce 
its dependence on cocoa were always constrained by the struc-
ture that they must not endanger the budget. But precisely 
because the revenue of the colony was based upon import and 
export customs dues, 21infrastructural and other developments 
were found to be limited by the vagaries of the international 
market. Thus little long-range planning to protect the 
economy could be implemented. 
In any case, all suggestions for revitalizing the eco-
nomy hinged around its open, extractive nature. As one 
colonial official stated: 
A country's wealth can be increased 
either by manufacture, that is to say, 
by converting raw products into finished 
articles, or, alternatively, by production 
and exportation. Of these two, the latter 
is, obviously, the Gold Coast's metier.22 
Discussions of diversification tended to revolve around 
suggestions to promote new agricultural exports, and indeed 
projects such as a sisal plantation in the early 1920's and· 
a COBra plantation in the latter part of t?at decade, were 
undertaken, without success, to reduce the dependence on 
cocoa.23 Industry was not considered at all in the many 
discussions of how to reduce the Gold Coast's monocultural 
dependence. 
The underdeveloped nature of an economy dependent on 
agricultural and mineral exports was exacerbated by the 
composition of imports, about two-thirds of which, even as 
late as 1935, were destined for the consumer market, and 
less than one-third of which could be considered investment 
goods which would promote the expansion of the economy. 
Table 4 Imports - Per Cent of the Total b:t: Value 24 
Year Tobacco Clothing Other Total Cons- fuel mach- trans- total 
fOOd leather consumer consumer true- inery_ port investment 
drink textiles goods imports lion goods 
1900 36.86 21.21 21.95 80.02 5,67 1.91 4.88 4.66 17.12 
1905 34.65 16.27 16.01 66.93 13.17 4.29 7.54 3.96 28.96 
CD 
1910 28.70 14.83 19.74 63.27 11.08 3.33 6.31 11.75 32.47 
w 
1915 38.38 11.44 16.99 66.81 10.65 2.87 5.91 10.31 29.74 
1920 28.88 20.95 15.20 65.03 10.70 5.67 5.04 9.08 30.49 
1925 27.06 28.20 12.39 67.65 8.46 5.72 4.52 6.90 25.60 
1930 26.72 27.79 12.89 67.40 8.56 5.18 5.03 8.31 27.08 
1935 29.69 20.09 14.72 64.50 9.00 4.34 6.23 10.63 30.20 
1939 24.32 19.74 12.66 56.72 9.06 3.26 8.51 17.75 38.58 
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Before 1900, guns, amunition, and liquor, unproductive goods 
which encouraged inter and intra-tribal warfare, were major 
imports. The importation of guns and ammunition was reduced 
after Ashanti and the Northern Territories had bE;!en "pacified", 
much to the chagrin. of the British suppliers. But liquor 
continued to constitute a large proportion of ;imports tin til 
restrictions were imposed upon it in the early 1920's.25 
The provisions imported from abroad encouraged Africans to 
become dependent upon foreign foods and to neglect their own 
supplies; in times of prosperity earnings were spent on foreign 
foods instead of being invested in production. While cons-
truction goods could be considered investment goods, as 
already mentione~, resources were diverted to family houses 
when other investments might have been made. The importing of 
motor vehicles did, however, encourage the development of an 
indigenous transport business alongside the larger European 
transport concerns. But the transport business suffered 
during the 1920's and 30's from restrictions on the carriage 
of cocoa and imported manufactured goods on major roads., 
restrictions which were designed to divert the revenues of the 
import-export traffic away from African-owned transpOrt 
businesses and toward the government-owned railways. 26 
Nor was the dearth of productive imports mitigated by 
direct European investment in the Gold Coast. It was only in 
~n~ng that direct European control of the process of produc-
tiOn., with consequent investment, occurred. Although Africans 
took 0ut mining concessions for gold in the 1870's and 1880's, 
they were obliged to sell these concessions to Europeans as 
they could not afford the equipment necessary for modern 
capitalist exploitation.27 Similarly when manganese and dia-
monds were discovered their production was immediately put 
into the hands of Europeans. But aside from mining, it was 
not necessary for Europeans to take over direct control to 
obtain the products they desired. The enterprise of the in-
habitants of the Gold Coast was sufficient to produce as much 
as the expatriates could buy of agricultural and arboricul-
tur,al goods. The companies were con tent to leave the land 
and its exploitation in African hands. 28 
Moreover, very little investment was required to main-
··~ tain the European retailing establishments which were neces-
sary to induce the Africans to buy cheap manufactured goods. 
The only investments made by the trading firms (aside from 
investments by some of the firms in their own transport busi-
nesses), were in buying and selling stations, ·~ucky little 
stores" , 29 a few sheds for storage of cocoa along the docks, 
and bungalows for their European staff. 
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Table 5. Values of Properties of Various Firms in 
the Gold Coast, 30 September, 1923. 30 
Company Value of Property 
African and Eastern Trade I:. 161,483 
corporation 
Ashanti-obuasi Trading Co. I:. 23,256 
F. and A. Swanzy Ltd. :r. 357,905 (all African properties) 
Gold Coast Machinery and 
Trading Co. Ltd. :r. 6,656 
Millers Limited J:, 270,824 (all African properties) 
Tarquah Trading Co. J:, 59,039 
Whatever investment was necessary for the improvement of 
the Gold Coast's agricultural produce was expected to be made 
by the farmers themselves, not by the firms which bought the 
produce. Gold Coast cocoa, for example, was not subject to 
compulsory quality control until 1934. Government pleas to 
finns to institute cocoa standards and to pay fanners better 
prices for better quality cocoa went unheeded. But without 
higher prices for better cocoa, farmers had neither the income 
nor the incentive to invest in such improvements as cocoa 
storage sheds. The business coillllluni ty was in favour of some 
sort of produce inspection scheme, but one which penalized the 
growers for selling poor quality cocoa, not the firms for 
buying it. · As an alternative to such penal legislation the 
government introduced a co-operative scheme whereby fanners 
would grCM better quality cocoa on their own initiative and in 
return be granted certain privileges such as access to credit. 
The firms agreed to pay higher prices for the better cocoa, but 
they offered a maximum increase of only 6 d. a load (60 lbs.), 
not enough to cover the farmers' extra expenses which averaged 
about 11-3/4 d. extra a load. 
As they argued that they should not be held responsible 
for investment in production, so also the European firms 
argued that they should not be responsible for government 
revenue in the Gold Coast. They resisted all attempts at 
taxation and reiterated constantly that in principle they 
were opposed to all import and export dues, the main source of 
revenue, since such dues, when applied to goods such as cocoa 
or timber, would render production too costly and prohibit 
competition with French or German traders. But in fact it was 
recognized by government, businessmen, and farmers alike that 
it was the African producer or consumer who actually bore the 
brunt of the import and export dues, and hence the burden of 
financing the government. Between 1886 and 1939 between 56% 
and 86% of the government's revenues came from import and 
export dues paid indirectly by African consumers and producers. 
Year _ 
1886 
1890 
1895 
1900 
1905 
1910 
1915 
1920 
1925 
1930 
1935 
1939 
Table 6. 
86 
Import and Export Dues as Per Cent of 
Government Revenue. 32 
Import Dues Export Dues Total Import & Export 
% % % 
84.42 84.42 
85.23 85.23 
86.05 86.05 
73.37 73 . 37 
57.00 57.00 
60.68 60.68 
56.87 56.87 
45.97 15.34 61.31 
52.60 6.66 59.26 
53.43 11.08 64.51 
56.85 16.49 73.34 
44.97 24.40 69.37 
Dues 
Whenever import duties were raised, so also prices charged to 
African customers were raised.Moreover, a price once raised 
was not lowered if the duties were removed. Similarly, after 
1916 when export duties were introduced, the price paid to the 
cocoa -producer was reduced. 33 
Africans were also responsible for financing construc-
tion and urbanization in the Gold Coast. Under the Public 
Lands Act of 1876 the government took for itself the privilege 
of expropriating,without payment,land necessary for railways 
and public buildings. Until 1919 the Government also used 
this Act to expropriate high-value land in areas such as 
Accra, Cape Coast, Sekondi and Kumasi and rent it out to ex-
patriate commercial firms, the rent monies going not to the 
original owners but to the government. 34 Such a policy was a 
deterrrent to the rise of an African bourgeoisie with an in-
come based on urban property values. 
Thus, once the economy of the Gold Coast had evolved 
into the classic peripheral pattern providing _agricultural, 
arboricultural and mineral products to the mother country in 
retu= for generally unproductive consumer goods, the Euro-
pean firms exerted their influence to frustrate government 
plans for diversification and development of the economy. 
Such plans were, in their eyes, unnecessary and likely to 
upset the balance of economic forces. What little development 
occurred was financed ultimately by the Africans themselves. 
Economic imperialism and the oligopolization of the Gold Coast 
trade ensured that this development would be limited. Indeed, 
underdevelopment became the norm as individual African traders 
were consistently denied the opportunity to partake in the 
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intern<!-tional trading system. Ultimately, both the economy 
and the indigenous farmers and traders were subject to the 
control of an external economy and a foreign capitalist class 
which consistently acted to maintain the Gold Coast in a 
peripheral role in the world capitalist system. 
* Based on a paper presented to the Canadian Association of 
African Studies, February 1975. This article is abstracted 
from the author's forthcoming doctoral dissertation, "Ex-
patriate Business and the African Response in Ghana, 1885-
1939", Department of Sociology, McGill University, Montreal. 
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Footnotes 
1 I use the term development to mean economic development, 
that is the growth of capitalism, with all its attendant 
ills, leaving moot the question whether development on 
socialist lines is possible in a society which has not 
yet undergone a capitalist phase. I define underdevelop-
ment as the process by which a country's realistic possi-
bilities for economic growth are thwarted and dis tor ted 1 
usually by contact with a more developed power. In 
defining underdevelopment thus, I am adopting the practice 
of A.G.Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin 
America (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1969) E. A. Brett, 
Capitalism and Underdevelopment in East Africa (London, 
Heinemann, 1973) and others. 
2 From "Notes on the United Africa Company Limited", in 
United Africa Company Archives, London, document 1/5580, 
"The History of the Company to 1938", 
3 Norman Edwards, Cadbury on the Gold Coast (Bournville, 
Publications Department, 1955, private circulation only) 
p. 29. 
4 This table is taken from listings of the United Africa 
Company's archival holdings in London. Unfortunately the 
author did not obtain access to the actual agreements. 
Presumably the list is not complete. 
5 Memorandum written by the Acting District Commissioner of 
Saltpond, 12 January 1938, file Adm , 23/1/956, Ghana 
National Archives, Cape Coast. 
6 P.N. Davies, The Trade Makers, Elder Dempster in West 
Africa, 1852-1972. (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1973). 
pp. 108-09. 
7 Royal Commission on Shipping Rings, Cd. 4668, 1909, testi-
mony of George Miller, Q. 4374. In the 1930's both UAC 
and John Holt were able to obtain substantial concessions 
from Elder Dempster because of their large shares in the 
West African trade; the former company set up its own 
shipping line in defiance of Elder Dempster's ruling 
that merchants must ship exclusively on Conference lines. 
The History of the United Africa Company Limited to 1938 
(London, United Africa Company, 1939, private circulation 
only), pp . 117 and 143. 
8 Directory of Directors, United Kingdom 1905, 1915, 1925. 
89 
9 Although one William Ocansey, of Ada, did instruct his 
Liverpool agent in 1880 to buy him a steam launch to be 
used in transporting goods down the Volta River. The 
agent absconded with the money, some b 2,679. John Ocan-
sey, African Trading (Liverpool, James Looney, 1881). p. 
16 ff. 
10 United Africa Company Archives, document 588, Bank of 
British West Africa. A sheet dated 1 February 1905 lists 
charges for various services including bank drafts, 
purchase and colrection of cheques, and charges for 
distribution of gold and acceptance of notes. In all 
cases "natives" and "African trading firms" are charged 
more than Government employees and Europeans. 
11 Pawning was a system whereby in return for a loan the 
debtor would "pawn" one of his relatives to work for the 
creditor until the debt was repaid. 
12 The following section is based on interviews with African 
formerly employed as agents for European firms. 
13 Examples of such contracts can be found in the United 
Africa Company Archives, files entitled "John Walkden 
and Co.", and "Pickering and Berthoud Native Storekeepers 
Agreement. " 
For a detailed description of the role of the cocoa 
broker, see Report of the Commission on the Marketing of 
West African Cocoa (The Nowell Commission), Cmd. 5845, 
1938. 
This section is based on the following sources. The In-
corporated Chamber of Commerce of Liverpool, Annual 
Reports 1886-1901 and African Trade Section, Minutes, 1902-
1925; The London Chamber of Commerce Incorporated, Annual 
Reports 1882-1903, and West Africa Section, Minutes, 1903-
1938; The Manchester Chamber of Commerce African Sectional 
Committee, Minutes, 1892-1938; and the Joint West Africa 
Committee, Minutes, 1905-1919. 
16 Such as the Royal Commission on Shipping Rings (Cd. 4668,· 
1909), the West African Currency Committee (Cd. 6426,1912), 
and the Committee on Trade and Taxation in British West 
Africa (Cmd. 1600, 1921). 
7 Such as Leslie Couper, who was on the West African 
Currency Board from 1921 to 1929, and his successor, R. 
Roy Wilson, on the Board from 1929 to 1938, both of whom 
were also Directors of the Bank of British West Africa. 
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West African CUrrency Board, Reports, 1920 - 1938. 
~8 The Broclamation announcing the takeover of the Gold Coast 
Colony in 1874 listed, among other purposes: " ••• the 
protection and encouragement of trade and traders, in-
cluding the construction, maintenance and improvement of 
roads, paths, bridges, harbour works, water ways, tele-
graphs, and other public works which benefit trade and 
promote civilization", and "The maintenance of an armed 
police force for the preservation of internal order and 
the prevention of foreign aggression." Quoted in J. E. 
Casely Hayford, Gold Coast Native Institutions; (London, 
Frank Cass and Co., 1970), p. 366. 
19 Speech by Governor Guggisberg in Gold Coast, Legislative 
Council Debates, 22 February 1926. 
20 Figures for 1886, 1890 and 1895 are based on the Gold 
Coast Blue Books. For 1900 and subsequent years, the 
percentages are based on Table 18, "Imports, Exports, and 
the Balance of Visible Trade", and Table 21a, "Value of 
Major Exports, 1900-1960" in G. B. Kay, The Political 
Economy of Colonialism in Ghana, (Cambridge, at the 
University Press, 1972), pp. 325-326 and 334-335. 
21 See table 6 below. 
22 Quoted by Nana Ofori Atta, an unofficial African represen-
tative, in the Gold Coast Legislative Council, 19 March 
1935. Unfortunately the o~iginal speaker, a former Colo-
nial Secretary, is unnamed. 
23 Also in the 1920's, one British firm offered to build up 
the banana export industry on condition that it be granted 
a monopoly of such exports. The offer was turned down. 
The firm involved, Elders and Fyffes, was connected to the 
Elder Dempster shipping line but, more immediately, was a 
subsidiary of United Fruit. Manchester Chamber of 
Commerce, Africa Section, Minutes, 12 February 1931. 
24 Figures are based on Kay,op. cit., Table 20a, "Value 
of Imports by Commodity Groups, 1900-1960", pp. 327-328. 
25 For a description of the use of alcohol in Ghanaian socie-
ty see Raymond E. Dumett, "The Social Impact .of the 
European Liquor Trade on the Akan of Ghana (Gold Coast and 
Asante) , 1875-1910", Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 
vol. I, summer 1974. Dumett argues .that the liquor trade 
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was not as deleterious as others have argued. The 
commercial importance of the arms and ammunition trade is 
attested to by the numerous references thereto in the 
records of the Chambers of Commerce of Manchester, London, 
and Liverpool, as well as by the frequency with which it 
was discussed in the Joint West Africa Committee. 
26 The problem of competition between roads and the railway 
is discussed in file Adm. 23/1/762 Ghana National Archives 
Cape Coast. See also Peter R. Gould, The Development of 
the Transport Pattern in Ghana (Evanston, Illinois, North-
western University Press, 1960), p. 71. 
27 For a description of the activities of African gold 
concessionaires in the late nineteenth century, see Chris-
topher Fyfe, Africanus Horton (New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1972), pp. 128-132. 
28 This is not meant to imply that the Europeans never tried 
to take over the land in the Gold Coast. In 1897 an 
attempt by the government to obtain possession of the land 
by passing a Crown Lands Bill had failed, owing both to 
opposition from the African community and to a decision 
by Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
that tribal ownership customs would be flouted were the 
land to be declared the property of the Crown. Evidently 
Chamberlain realized that it was not necessary to take 
over the land in order to encourage production of palm 
oil and cocoa, both of which were already flourishing 
under African peasant agriculture. For details of the 
Drown Lands Bill, see David Kimble, A Political History 
of Ghana 1850-1928, (Oxford, at the Clarendon Press,l963), 
Ch.IX "The A.R.P.S. and the Lands, 1889-1900". 
29 These words were used by a former European cocoa buyer 
when describing his company's premises in an interview. 
30 From papers in the United Africa Company Archives, docu-
ment 1/5580, "Notes on the United Africa Company Limited". 
It is possible that some of these prorerti.es were over-
valued as the purpose of the valuation was to indicate the 
worth of the African and Eastern Trade Corporation upon 
its amalgamation with the Niger Company in 1929 • 
31 Report of the Commission on the Marketing of West African 
Cocoa, op. cit., _ pp. 42-43. 
32 Figures for 1886, 1890, 1895 are based on Gold Coast 
Blue Books. For 1900 and subsequent years, figures are 
based on Kay, op. cit., Table 24a, "Government Revenue by 
__ ........ 
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Source, 1900-1960", pp. 348-9. 
33 That the government was aware that it was the African 
peasant producers who ultimately paid the cocoa export 
tax is indicated in a statement made by the Gold Coast 
Treasurer that "... the direct effect of this tax would be 
felt by the cocoa planter in as much as he would receive so 
much less per head load ·u/3) that he would otherwise 
receive". Gold Coast, Legislative Council Debates, 26 
September 1916. 
34 "We have done away once and for all with the old policy 
of the Government taking up land and sub-letting it after-
wards and holding on to the rent themselves. The natives 
are going to have the benefit of the land rented to 
merchants .•• " Governor Guggisberg, Gold Coast Legislative 
Council Debates. 17 November 1919, p. 213. 
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